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Abstract: Intra-EU migrants have traditionally faced few pressures or incentives to formalise their 
'permanent' residence or to naturalise in their EU host countries. Focusing on the United Kingdom and 
combining an analysis of secondary administrative data and primary online survey data (N=1,413), this 
article examines practices and attitudes to such legal integration in the context of the 2016 EU 
Referendum among five major EU nationality groups. The analysis reveals that British citizenship is the 
main legal mechanism of integration among intra-EU migrants in the UK and that while there is 
continuity in this respect with pre-Brexit processes, Brexit also has a strong but differential effect as a 
driver of legal integration. The article also identifies some of the main decision-influencing factors 
shaping legal integration, making a significant contribution to understanding the complexities of 
integrative processes in times of radical structural change.  
 
 
Introduction 
Over the past two decades ‘the emergence of a new European migration system’ (Favell 2008b) 
reliant on the policy of free movement of people within the European Union (EU) has paralleled 
a ‘renewed emphasis on assimilation and citizenship’ in policy and public discourse on non-
EU immigration (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 1). Intra-EU ‘movers,’ in both theory and 
practice, enjoy the liberty to ‘keep their options deliberately open’ in respect to plans of settling 
in the host EU member state, moving to another EU country, or returning to their origin country 
(Eade, Drinkwater, and Garapich 2007, 11, Favell 2008a). Furthermore, supranational EU 
citizenship rights afford them similar treatment in most aspects of life to those enjoyed by the 
national citizens of the EU countries in which they live, regardless of the length of their 
residence and future migration plans. Consequently, there have been few pressures on or 
incentives for mobile EU citizens to enter a formal path to permanent settlement and 
naturalisation – what we here call ‘legal integration’ – in their host countries. 
This article questions whether such detached attitudes toward ‘legal integration’ still 
prevail among intra-EU migrants. It was argued previously that the changing political climate 
of the post-Euro-crisis years has been increasingly turning mobile EU citizens ‘into immigrants 
who no longer enjoy unconditional European citizenship; migrants who are no longer free to 
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be just European residents, and whose tolerated presence may be henceforth conditional on 
their willingness to integrate’ (Favell 2013, 57). Graeber (2016) has tested statistically the 
consequences of this trend, and his analysis ‘reveals that the Euro crisis and its economic and 
political consequences seem to be reincentivizing intra-EU migrants to acquire citizenship in 
other member states, despite the rights and benefits derived from EU citizenship’ (2016, 1671). 
Others, like Dubucs et al. (2017), whose work describes the ‘complex modes’ of structural and 
socio-cultural integration prevalent among EU movers engaging in ‘mobile lifestyles’ as well 
as in ‘multiple forms of embeddedness,’ also feel obliged to ask ‘whether dramatically 
changing macrocontexts in Europe – like Brexit and the rise of anti-EU nationalism – do alter 
this general picture and impose onto migrants more traditional forms of integration into host 
societies’ (592). In this article we address precisely this question. 
We examine the case of the United Kingdom (UK), where the politicization of intra-
EU free movement in recent years culminated in a referendum vote to leave the EU in June 
2016 (Glencross 2016). Since the 2004 EU enlargement, 1  the UK has welcomed to its 
workforce over 5 million new EU nationals.2 Around 3 million EU nationals were estimated to 
be living in the country at the time of the EU referendum and being faced with the possibility 
of a dramatic change to their legal rights (Office for National Statistics 2016). Since the legal 
dimensions of residence and integration are in this case the processes most immediately 
affected by the unfolding events, we are interested here in examining EU movers’ presumed 
detachment vis-à-vis legal integration.  
Our main aim is twofold: (1) to test whether the ‘reincentivizing of citizenship’ 
identified by Graeber (2016: 1687) is a broader phenomenon pre-dating Brexit and (2) to assess 
Brexit’s effect on legal integration. To do so, we combine a statistical analysis of administrative 
data on in-migration and legal integration trends over the past decade (Home Office 2018a, b, 
Department for Work and Pensions 2018) and cross-sectional data on future legal integration 
plans from a purposefully designed online survey conducted in the three months before the EU 
referendum. This approach allows us to examine the phenomenon of legal integration from two 
complementary perspectives. Given that our data originate from a strategic point in time when 
the UK had not yet formally exited the EU, we define ‘Brexit’ broadly as an emotionally 
charged discursive historical moment of heightened uncertainty, fit to explain social attitudes 
and behaviour in conditions of radical sociolegal transformation. 
To capture possible differences based on origin country, we focus on a selected 
quantitative sample of five indicative nationality groups: Polish, Hungarian, Romanian, 
Portuguese, and German citizens (N=1,413). Related to our main aim, we also test the 
significance for legal integration of various factors identified in the broader empirical literature 
as contributing to settlement practices. Our analysis shows that several socio-demographic 
                                                 
1 The eight Central Eastern European (CEE) countries accessing the EU in 2004 were: the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Romania and Bulgaria (the EU2) joined 
in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. Although the UK immediately opened its labour market to the EU8, it imposed the 
legally permitted maximum length of transitional restrictions of seven years for citizens of the EU2. 
2 National Insurance Number (NINo) registration statistics show that between April 2004 and July 2016, a total 
of 5,021,661 such numbers were allocated to EU nationals, of which 2,471,866 went to nationals of EU8 
countries and 757,079 to those from the EU2 (Department for Work and Pensions 2018). These figures reflect 
the total number of working-age migrants who have registered for a NINo, not the total number of foreign EU 
national residents at any particular point in time.  
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variables are significant in shaping stated plans of legal integration, which is an important 
finding that points to the social roots of legal integration choices. By bridging the gap between 
social and legal processes of migrant integration, the article makes a significant contribution 
to understanding the complexity of integrative processes in times of radical sociolegal change. 
The article’s main argument is that national citizenship returns as – or remains – the 
main legal mechanism of integration among EU movers in the UK and that this development 
has pre-Brexit roots. The leading factor in naturalisation plans and practices is often the mere 
eligibility to apply for citizenship, and the motivations probably derive from pre-Brexit failings 
in the lived experience of supranational citizenship. At the same time, ‘Brexit’ is an even 
stronger driver of legal integration among those who were previously engaged in more ‘mobile 
lifestyles,’ and this finding also reflects important differences between nationality groups. 
Overall, the article identifies the perceived weakness of EU citizenship as the main guarantor 
of long-term residence and settlement rights and, through an original dataset and rigorous 
quantitative analysis, makes a significant early contribution to emerging empirical research 
into what might be called sociolegal de-Europeanization. 
Before describing our data and methods in more detail and discussing our findings, we 
briefly outline the conceptual and policy framework of legal integration within the EU and 
review the empirical literature on the social factors influencing migrant settlement. 
Settlement and integration: legal framework and social factors 
The question as to whether EU movers will settle long-term or permanently in their countries 
of residence raises many empirical and conceptual difficulties. For one, EU movers may not 
feel compelled to formulate clear plans of return or settlement at any stage of their migration, 
and those who do will just as often see them changed as any other migrant group (Drinkwater 
and Garapich 2015, Ryan 2015, Ganga 2006, Ryan and Mulholland 2014). Furthermore, the 
increasingly common social experience of living transnationally and in super-diverse settings 
renders concepts such as ‘settlement’ and ‘integration’ overly narrow and inflexible 
(Grzymala-Kazlowska and Phillimore 2018). Instead, migration scholars have adopted 
conceptual tools of higher complexity to describe lived experiences of integration and 
settlement in terms of social ‘embedding’ (Ryan 2018, Ryan and Mulholland 2014), 
‘emplacement’ (Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2013, Wessendorf 2018), or ‘anchoring’ (Grzymala-
Kazlowska 2016, 2018). Through these concepts, they describe migrant strategies as variably 
‘anchored’ on a ‘continuum of emplacement’ that runs through degrees of social embeddedness 
and residence plans ‘from temporary, short-term through to longer-term, without migrants ever 
formally making the decision to settle permanently’ (Ryan and Mulholland 2014, 598).  
Much less attention has been paid to legal mechanisms of integration. To some degree, 
individual statuses could also be mapped on a so-called ‘continuum of legal emplacement.’ 
Meissner (2018), for example, has charted the extent of ‘legal status diversity’ in the UK’s 
immigration law, and Wessendorf (2018) has emphasised the determining influence of 
different legal statuses on processes of settlement and socio-economic integration. Kubal 
(2012) has shown that the experience of migrants from ‘new’ EU member states has been one 
of ‘gradual’ legal integration rather than undifferentiated status privilege. Nevertheless, at the 
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time of the EU referendum debates, the legal status of most EU movers in the UK was less 
differentiated, offering two main legal mooring points on the emplacement continuum: formal 
permanent residence and naturalisation as British citizens. For simplicity, we refer to these two 
primary status options as legal ‘integration.’ We acknowledge, however, that the diversity of 
individual circumstances significantly complicates access to and attitudes toward these statuses 
and that in many cases, they effectively serve as modes of legal ‘anchoring,’ helping establish 
legal ‘footholds which allow migrants to acquire a relative socio-psychological stability and 
function effectively in new life settings’ (Grzymala-Kazlowska 2018, 255). 
Examining legal integration in cases where it is not a formal requirement, as in the case 
of intra-EU mobility, can provide an important complementary viewpoint to social practices 
and experiences leading to long-term ‘settlement,’ and the two may intersect in various ways. 
We are primarily interested in exploring these intersections empirically, as a first step toward 
a more unified conceptual approach to sociolegal integration. In the following we first briefly 
outline the legal dimensions of EU movers’ long-term settlement in the UK, before reviewing 
some of the socio-demographic factors commonly associated with long-term settlement in the 
broader migration literature. 
Legal perspectives on long-term settlement 
The legal rights to settlement of intra-EU migrants in their countries of residence derive 
from their supranational EU citizenship rights. According to the EU Citizenship Directive 
[2004/38/EC], ‘Union citizens who have chosen to settle long term in the host Member State’ 
have an automatic right to enjoy permanent residency in that country, following five continuous 
years of legal residence. The EU legal framework is meant to assure that obtaining permanent 
resident status does not require any declaration of intention or an application procedure, 
although a certifying document must be issued by host Member states upon request by a 
qualifying person. The possession of a certifying document, however, ‘may under no 
circumstances be made a precondition for the exercise of a right or the completion of an 
administrative formality’ [Art. 25 (1)]. In other words, these measures are explicitly meant to 
shield intra-EU migrants from any pressure of national legal integration in the host member 
state, while ensuring that their social, economic, and political rights are guaranteed. 
Although the transposition and implementation of the EU Citizenship Directive has not 
always been straightforward and although several countries continue to adopt unduly restrictive 
interpretations of EU law (Shaw, Miller, and Fletcher 2013, Mügge and van der Haar 2016), 
until recently, there have been few incentives for EU movers to formalise their long-term 
settlement within the legal systems of host countries. The potential benefits of legal integration 
defined in these terms manifested only under certain personal conditions, since EU citizenship 
has never been able to unambiguously guarantee certain social rights, particularly those related 
to family life, even for highly skilled and economically advantaged EU movers (Favell 2008a, 
Ryan and Mulholland 2014). However, amidst an increasingly hostile anti-EU-migration 
public discourse and growing concerns about the changing relationship between the UK and 
the EU, this structure of incentives is arguably undergoing significant change (Graeber 2016).  
In response to this new socio-political context, mobile EU nationals who have chosen 
to settle long term in the UK have the option to formalise their legal entitlement to permanent 
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residence within the UK’s national immigration framework through two related measures of 
legal integration: they can either obtain a Permanent Residence Certificate (PRC) or become 
naturalised as British citizens. As of November 2015, obtaining a PRC was also a formal 
requirement before an application for British citizenship, and while obtaining a PRC does not 
require any significant financial investment or assimilatory commitment, naturalising as a 
British citizen sets the same requirements for EU and non-EU nationals alike.3 
Since the UK’s vote to leave the EU, the PRC is no longer merely a selective 
mechanism in the transition to naturalisation but has become the only available legal measure 
for securing one’s rights to long-term settlement. As a good reflection of the legal uncertainty 
facing intra-EU migrants during the Brexit transition, at the time of writing, the official 
governmental advice stated that ‘if you already have a permanent residence document it won’t 
be valid after the UK leaves the EU’ but that ‘a new scheme will be available for EU citizens 
and their family members to apply to stay in the UK after it leaves the EU’ (Home Office 
2018c). Nonetheless, holding a PRC allows you ‘to apply for British citizenship after you’ve 
lived in the UK for 6 years,’4 and the latter status will not be affected by the UK’s exit from 
the EU. 
Social determinants of long-term settlement 
The empirical literature has primarily approached the question of settlement by highlighting 
factors that have proved conducive to putting down social roots in a host country (Ryan 2018). 
In the following, we summarise some of the most commonly cited ‘rooting’ factors: family 
ties, gender, employment status, education, language proficiency and bridging social capital, 
length of stay, original migration plans, stigma and the political climate. 
Family ties in the host country, especially having children, are most commonly 
associated with long-term settlement plans (White 2011, Ryan et al. 2009, Landesmann, 
Leitner, and Mara 2015, Ganga 2006, McGhee, Heath, and Trevena 2012). In respect to gender, 
women have been traditionally suggested to be more inclined toward permanent settlement 
than men (Pessar and Mahler 2003), and this assumption has received some moderate and 
inconclusive confirmation in correlational analyses of intra-EU migration (Snel, Faber, and 
Engbersen 2015, Drinkwater and Garapich 2015, Landesmann, Leitner, and Mara 2015). 
Being employed has been shown to positively influence the likelihood of permanent 
settlement (Wessendorf 2018), although under conditions of free movement, this finding has 
been qualified with respect to the socio-economic status of the job, suggesting that association 
with highly skilled professions makes temporary migration more likely (Landesmann, Leitner, 
and Mara 2015). Similarly, more highly educated migrants have been shown more likely to 
return, although education may again relate to mismatch with the performed job (Drinkwater 
and Garapich 2015, Dustmann and Weiss 2007). 
Language proficiency and bridging social capital have been identified as highly 
                                                 
3  See ‘The British Nationality (General) (Amendment No. 3) Regulations 2015,’ 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/1806/made. 
4 This ‘means you must wait another 12 months if you’ve only lived in the UK for 5 years when you get your 
document. But you can apply immediately if: you’ve already lived in the UK for 6 years when you get your 
document’ (Home Office 2018c). 
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important for successful labour-market and socio-cultural integration (Knight, Lever, and 
Thompson 2014, Cook, Dwyer, and Waite 2011, Ryan et al. 2008, McGhee, Trevena, and 
Heath 2015), which, in turn, favour settlement plans (Snel, Faber, and Engbersen 2015, 
Constant and Massey 2002). The length of time spent in the host country is an important factor 
in the development of language skills and social ties, although authors have recently 
highlighted the limitations of a simple linear and progressive understanding of temporality in 
this respect and described more dynamic processes associated with the lifecycle (Ryan 2016, 
Ryan and Mulholland 2014, Hunter 2011, Ganga 2006). Conversely, original intentions and 
plans at the early migratory stage have been shown to impact subsequent integration outcomes 
and longer-term settlement (Mara and Landesmann 2013). Luthra, Platt, and Salamońska 
(2016, 30) suggested that particularly under EU free movement conditions, ‘preferences are 
more strongly linked to outcomes’ than in visa-controlled types of migration. 
Stigmatised migrant identities can become an incentive for both return plans and socio-
cultural integration (cf. Moroşanu and Fox 2013). There is a perceived ‘clear hierarchy between 
EU citizens from the West and those from Eastern Europe’ (Mügge and van der Haar 2016, 
82–83), shaped by what Bolognani and Erdal (2017) call ‘political climate’ – ‘political rhetoric, 
media representations and resulting public perceptions’ (354). We also know that certain 
migrant groups have been exposed to more negative media representations than others (Allen 
2016), with Romanians in particular being portrayed as ‘socio-political and cultural 
“problems”’ (Mădroane 2012, 120). There is already emerging qualitative evidence that 
Romanian nationals are using naturalisation as a method of status enhancement in the face of 
perceived nationality-based discrimination (Paraschivescu 2016). 
Our aim in this article is to test whether these socio-demographic and interpersonal 
factors identified as shaping practices of long-term settlement also affect aspirations of legal 
integration. Doing so allows us to address our main research questions concerning the 
reincentivizing of citizenship within intra-EU migration and Brexit’s effect on legal integration 
in a more complex empirical framework and lay the basis for a more unified conceptual 
understanding of sociolegal integration. 
 
Data and methods 
Our analysis relies on two quantitative data sources: (1) secondary administrative data on NINo 
registrations and applications for PRC and British citizenship over the past decade (Home 
Office 2018a, b, Department for Work and Pensions 2018) and (2) an original online survey 
carried out in the three months leading up to the UK’s referendum on EU membership. 
Although we aim to relate the results from the two data-sources, we give due consideration to 
the fact that they measure different phenomena: responses to our survey reflect attitudes and 
self-declared future plans rather than concrete past behaviour. 
The administrative data not only provide a contextual overview of actual legal 
integration patterns but also help address our first research question of whether a 
‘reincentivization of citizenship’ was already noticeable in the pre-Brexit years (see Graeber 
2016). This question will be explored through a bivariate correlational analysis. The survey 
data then allow a more detailed cross-sectional assessment of subjective attitudes toward legal 
7 
 
integration, and of the various factors affecting these attitudes, through a series of multiple 
binomial and multinomial regression models. Before presenting our analysis and findings, we 
provide a brief overview of the survey design and the variables employed in multivariate 
statistical models. 
Survey design 
The online survey was conceived and conducted as part of a broader research project, 
with data collection taking place between the 2nd of March and the 23rd of June 2016. 
Questionnaires translated into several languages and targeting some of the most numerous EU 
national groups from different EU Accession waves living in the UK were administered 
through various online platforms – mainly nationality-specific Facebook groups – following a 
strategy of ‘appropriate targeting’ by which we actively engaged in inviting participants from 
targeted communities (see Miller and Sønderlund 2010, McGhee, Moreh, and Vlachantoni 
2017). 
For our current aims we restrict our analysis to a sample of 1,413 respondents 
comprising five national groups: Polish (N=965), Hungarian (N=128), Romanian (N=128), 
Portuguese (N=120), and German (N=72) nationals. Due to the nature of our research 
questions, we have excluded current full-time students from our sample and those who already 
held British citizenship. The choice for the five national groups is meant to provide 
representation of both ‘old’ member states (EU15) and the ‘new’ 2004 (EU8) and 2007 (EU2) 
Central-Eastern European Accession countries, while making sampling concessions based on 
convenience considerations. Thus, while the Portuguese, Poles, and Romanians are the largest 
national groups representing the three different EU Accession groupings respectively at the 
time of the survey,5 Hungarians were included because of existing evidence regarding their 
relatively different mobility patterns compared to other EU8 citizens (Luthra, Platt, and 
Salamońska 2016, Moreh 2014), as well as the availability of linguistic resources for 
conducting a targeted data collection in Hungarian. On the other hand, German nationals are 
included because of expectations of different mobility trajectories between those from 
northwestern Europe and those from the southern European countries most acutely affected by 
the enduring Euro-crisis (see Graeber 2016), even though German nationals were targeted 
through their respective online communities with an English-language questionnaire only. 
Consequently, our sample is not representative of the whole EU migrant population in 
the UK, and the generalisability of our analysis is in this respect restricted. However, our aim 
is not to provide generalised conclusions but to assess certain trends and enable the formulation 
of working hypotheses for further research. Nevertheless, through appropriate targeting we did 
aim to achieve as representative a sample as possible in respect to socio-demographic 
characteristics (Miller and Sønderlund 2010). As a basis for assessing our sample’s socio-
demographic representativeness, Table S1 in the Supplementary Materials (SM) offers a 
comparison with the Labour Force Survey (LFS) sample for the same approximate period 
(April–June 2016), broken down by selected nationality groups. Although the LFS itself suffers 
                                                 
5 At the end of 2015, Polish nationals were the largest resident group in the UK, estimated at 916,000. The second 
largest EU national group – apart from Irish citizens (332,000) who have a historically particular relationship and 
status in the UK – were Romanian nationals (232,000), followed by the citizens of Portugal (219,000) and Italy 
(193,000) (Office for National Statistics 2016). 
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from several limitations, especially underrepresentation of recently arrived migrants, the 
comparison can nevertheless offer a valuable understanding of the limitations of our own 
survey sample. The most significant difference is in the over-representation of women in our 
sample (64% vs. 54% in LFS). Overall, however, our data collection method proved to yield a 
generally even sample comparable to those obtained through traditional methodologies such as 
the LFS.6 In light of the gender imbalance, however, we strive in our analysis to employ 
variables that can reduce the bias caused by disparities related to gender. 
Dependent variables 
The survey asked about subjective attitudes toward naturalisation in general and legal 
integration plans under two scenarios still available at the time of the survey: under the UK’s 
continued EU membership and in the eventuality of Brexit. Survey questions were formulated 
as follows: 
(1) ‘Regardless of the EU referendum, what is your most likely plan for the next 5 
years?’  
(2) ‘If the UK votes to leave the EU, what will your most likely action be?’ 
(3) ‘At any point in the future, are you planning to apply for British citizenship?’ 
The first two questions concerning medium-term future plans and Brexit-scenario short-term 
actions shared the same six response options (‘return,’ ‘re-migration’ to either another EU or a 
non-EU country, ‘no plan/action,’ ‘PRC,’ and ‘naturalisation’), which can be grouped together 
to reflect three general residence-related options: (a) to leave the UK in the short to medium 
term; (b) to settle long-term in the UK – in the phrasing of the EU Citizenship Directive – by 
simply planning to remain in the UK for longer than five years and deriving residence rights 
directly from EU citizenship; or (c) to formalise their long-term residence status within UK 
immigration law via legal integration measures such as a PRC or naturalisation. For simplicity, 
we refer to these options as ‘exit,’ ‘derived permanent residence’ (DPR), and proactive ‘legal 
integration’ plans, respectively. 
In regression models, the first question is operationalised as a dependent variable with 
three levels measuring medium-term plans under a no-Brexit scenario. The individual change 
between 5-year plans and Brexit-scenario actions is then operationalised as a dichotomous 
independent variable (‘Changed plans in case of Brexit’) to measure which medium-term plan 
is most likely to be affected (i.e. altered) by Brexit. Essentially, this analysis provides a 
statistical measure of Brexit’s possible effect on existing plans of legal integration.  
The third survey question asking about general future naturalisation plans was a simple 
yes/no item in a later section of the questionnaire. It provides a dichotomous dependent variable 
meant to assess factors related to general attitudes toward naturalisation, as well as to test the 
relationship between the formalisation of permanent residence and naturalisation plans. This 
                                                 
6 Some other noteworthy differences emerge with respect to age (our sample has a narrower age range of 19–65, 
compared to 16–97 in the LFS) and consequently the share of those economically ‘inactive’ (i.e. including 
those retired) (11% in our sample vs. 18% in the LFS). Those who had been in the UK for over 9 years are 
also underrepresented in our sample (30% vs. 47%). The validity of the differences in socio-economic status 
and education, however, are harder to assess due to the high number of missing values and misclassification 
in our survey and the LFS respectively. 
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analysis can therefore provide an understanding of whether PRC is more likely to be perceived 
as a step toward citizenship than a legal integration status in its own right. 
Independent variables 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample’s main socio-demographic, 
interpersonal, and attitudinal characteristics. These reflect the factors that emerged from the 
literature review as likely to shape migrants’ settlement and serve as the main independent 
variables in our statistical analysis. Examining the effect of these factors contributes to our 
understanding of the broader relational and motivational structure underpinning subjective 
attitudes toward legal integration. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
 
Total (N=1,413) 
% N 
Female 64% 910 
Age (cont.): Mean (SD) 38 (9) 
Education: Postgraduate 18% 253 
Education: Undergraduate 19% 266 
Education: Post-secondary/Further ed. 15% 212 
Education: Secondary  33% 473 
Education: Vocational/Professional 11% 162 
Married/in civil partnership 45% 638 
Children: all in UK 46% 648 
Children: some/all not in UK 4% 57 
No children 48% 677 
Time in UK (cont.): Mean (SD) 6y6m (4y) 
Time in UK: <3y 24% 345 
Time in UK: 3–6y 23% 324 
Time in UK: 6–9y 22% 306 
Time in UK: 9+y 30% 427 
Econ: Employed full time 60% 844 
Econ: Employed part-time 15% 208 
Econ: Self-employed 9% 130 
Econ: Inactive 11% 152 
Partner Econ: single 32% 451 
Partner Econ: full time 43% 611 
Partner Econ: part-time 5% 73 
Partner Econ: Self-employed 7% 93 
Partner Econ: Inactive 6% 87 
Has accessed benefits 54% 760 
Uses English at work 78% 1109 
Uses English at home 20% 282 
Assesses ‘socio-political’ factors as important reason for migration to UK 19% 265 
UK citizenship: Eligible 41% 576 
UK citizenship: DK (the requirements) 27% 381 
UK citizenship: Not eligible 25% 351 
Personal effect of Brexit: Negative 57% 809 
Personal effect of Brexit: None 25% 349 
Personal effect of Brexit: Positive 4% 57 
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Brexit likelihood: Unlikely 24% 340 
Brexit likelihood: Equal likelihood 48% 682 
Brexit likelihood: Likely 26% 363 
Changed plans in Brexit scenario 22% 307 
Note: Percentages are in respect to totals (i.e. remaining differences to 100% are due to ‘missing’, ‘other’ and 
‘prefer not to say’ responses) 
 
The basic socio-demographic variables considered are sex, age (<40 vs. 40+), educational 
qualification, marital/partnership status, parental status, years spent in the UK (<3, 3–6, 6–9, 
and 9+), the employment status of the ‘economic unit,’ and nationality. With respect to parental 
status, although our data differentiate between having dependent children who live in the UK 
and who live in a different country (see Table 1), the low number of the latter does not allow 
its effective use in a regression analysis, so we treat parental status as a simple dichotomous 
category. 
 ‘Economic unit’ is derived from two variables, one referring to the respondent’s 
employment status and another to the employment status of the respondent’s partner. Given 
the general overrepresentation of women in our sample among those ‘looking after family,’ 
this derived variable provides a more nuanced understanding of employment conditions that 
may influence decision-making within partnership units rather than individually. We consider 
the ‘unit’ to be in full-time employment if the respondent is either single and employed full-
time or in a long-term partnership with both partners being employed full-time. We further 
differentiate if only one partner is in full-time employment, if at least one is self-employed, and 
if both partners are either inactive or working at most on a part-time basis.  
Three further variables reflect more complex social and interpersonal characteristics: 
use of welfare benefits and exposure to English language at home and in the workplace. We 
measure whether a respondent had accessed any of the most common welfare benefits relating 
to employment, housing, disability, and family life during his/her residence in the UK through 
a dichotomous variable. We would expect that engagement with the British welfare state has 
an emplacing effect due to facilitating interaction with state institutions. Use of English at home 
and in a workplace environment (both coded as dichotomous) is the closest approximation of 
‘socio-cultural’ integration we have available in our dataset, the expectation being that 
exposure to the English language would increase the likelihood of long-term settlement through 
legal integration.  
A final set of variables represent further factors potentially affecting legal integration: 
original migration intentions, eligibility for naturalisation in the short-term, and anxiety about 
Brexit. To estimate the role of original migration intentions on future legal integration plans, 
we include a dichotomous variable denoting whether socio-political reasons played an 
important role in choosing the UK, rather than another EU country, as a destination. This 
variable was derived from a 10-item question block following a Principal Components 
Analysis (PCA) that showed reasons such as ‘better medical care,’ ‘more political/civic 
freedom,’ ‘better schooling for children,’ and ‘better social benefits’ as reliable for our 
purposes (Cronbach’s α = .75) (Cortina 1993). Following the PCA, we constructed a scale 
measure based on these four socio-political reasons items, which we then dichotomised for our 
analysis (for a detailed description of the PCA procedure and results from preliminary tests of 
suitability, see PCA in the SM).  
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Self-declared civic status in respect to British citizenship estimates awareness of 
‘eligibility’ for naturalisation within one year. While eligibility may limit one’s legal 
integration options in the short term, awareness of the legal requirements for naturalisation 
hints at a more basic interest in acquiring British citizenship. The variable denoting ‘anxiety 
about Brexit’ is derived from two items: perceived likelihood of a Brexit outcome in the EU 
referendum and the expected personal effects of a Brexit vote. Brexit anxiety reflects the 
attitude of those who felt that there was at least ‘an equal probability’ of a vote in support of 
leaving the EU, while at the same time considering that a possible Brexit would have a ‘very 
negative’ or ‘somewhat negative’ effect on their lives and the lives of their family members.  
To save space, we present full details of our survey questions, response categories, and 
derived variables in Table S3 (SM). Table S2 also provides a more detailed version of Table 1, 
with data broken down by nationality groups. 
Analysis and findings 
Mere eligibility? Legal integration trends between 2002 and 2017 
As a first step in our analysis, we gauge the magnitude of migratory and legal integration 
practices of EU nationals in the UK. One available, although imperfect,7 method of measuring 
migration inflows is NINo allocations, and Figure 1 shows the evolution in the number of 
NINo-s allocated to EU27 nationals yearly between January 2002 and January 2018 and, within 
that, to nationals of the origin countries included in our survey.  
 
 
Figure 1: NINo allocations, Permanent Residence Certificate applications and British 
citizenship applications (2002–2017) 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Department for Work and Pensions (2018) and Home 
Office (2018a, 2017b). 
Notes: PRC data contain all applications for ‘documents certifying permanent residence and permanent 
residence cards’ processed in that year, including issued, refused, and invalid applications. It is therefore not 
restricted to issued documents but may not count applications filed but not yet processed. 
                                                 
7 A NINo is required of anyone planning to undertake employment or self-employment in the UK, and as such it 
is more reliable as a measure of economic mobility than of other types of migration. 
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Figure 1 also presents the number of processed PRC applications (PRC) and applications for 
British citizenship (Citizenship) in each year for which data are available (right axis). We find 
that NINo numbers peaked in 2007 but have plateaued at record heights since 2014, following 
the lifting of transitional restrictions for EU2 nationals.8 At the same time we see an increase 
in both PRCs and naturalisation applications in 2013, followed by a sudden soar particularly in 
PRCs during 2016 and 2017. This tenfold increase of PRCs to almost 190,000 (compared to 
the average of around 17,000 in any five-year period prior to 2016) is undoubtedly caused by 
the combined effect of the EU Referendum outcome and the previously mentioned November 
2015 introduction of the requirement to obtain a PRC before making an application for British 
citizenship. However, the 2013 peak in PRCs and citizenship applications must be explained 
by other factors. Given that most EU nationals exercising Treaty Rights in the UK become 
eligible for naturalisation as British citizens after six years, one obvious hypothesis is that the 
2013 peak in citizenship applications correlates with the 2007 peak in NINo allocations, which 
would mean that an important driver of naturalisation prior to Brexit was the mere eligibility 
to apply.9  
To test this hypothesis, we performed a correlation analysis between the number of 
allocated NINOs in year t – as a proxy for arrival year – and the number of citizenship 
applications in year t+6, with data allowing the consideration of ten such year-pairs (2002/2008 
to 2011/2017) (Figure 2).  
We are primarily interested in the period up to the 2009/2015 year-pair because it 
predates the start of the EU Referendum campaign and is thus telling of pre-Brexit processes. 
A statistically significant correlation would indicate that naturalisation, despite its high 
associated costs, had carried incentives even before Brexit. For this period, we indeed find a 
strong and statistically significant correlation for the entire EU migrant population (r=.771, 
p=.025), as well as for nationals of the selected post-2004 Accession countries (Figure 2). The 
relationship is not statistically significant, however, in the case of Portuguese and German 
nationals. If we extend the analysis to the Brexit period and include the 2010/2016 and 
2011/2017 year-pairs, the correlation breaks off in most cases, except for groups that have 
arrived more recently – like Romanians, Hungarians, and Portuguese – in whose case NINo 
allocations themselves peaked in 2011. These results provide some support for the ‘mere 
eligibility’ hypothesis but at the same time highlight important differences based on nationality. 
Furthermore, the sudden rise in naturalisation rates during 2016 and 2017 shows, as we would 
expect, that Brexit provides a much stronger motivation for legal integration than ‘mere 
eligibility’ previously had. 
                                                 
8 It is worth noting that NINo-s are less useful for assessing the in-migration of EU2 nationals who benefitted 
from free movement since 2007 while at the same time facing difficulties in obtaining a NINo prior to the end 
of transitional restrictions on their labour-market access in 2014. This partially explains the sudden rise in 
NINo allocations in 2014, while their beneficiaries were not necessarily recent arrivals. On the other hand, the 
2007 peak was not caused by EU2 citizens; registrations by Romanian and Bulgarian nationals amounted to 
6.5% of the total number of applications in that year. Since 2014, however, over one third of all new NINo-s 
were issued to EU2 nationals (32% in 2014, 33% in 2015, 37% in 2016, and 39% in 2017). 
9 A similar hypothesis regarding PRCs is more difficult to make, given that obtaining a PRC was not previously 
required before naturalisation and did not provide any substantial additional entitlements. Also, our data refer 
to processed PRC applications, and their processing could take up to six months (which may partly explain 
the peak in 2013 as opposed to 2012). 
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Figure 2: Correlation between NINo allocations (2002-2011) and citizenship 
applications (2008-2017), (year-paired by six-year lapses) 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Department for Work and Pensions (2018) and Home 
Office (2018a). Notes: To enhance the visualisation of the correlation, NINo allocations and citizenship 
grants in each respective year are presented as percentage of their total number over their respective time-
period. Years-pairs should be read as follows: 02/08 refers to NINo allocations in 2002 and British 
citizenship applications in 2008. 
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Future plans of legal integration: descriptive results 
Data obtained from our survey allow a more detailed cross-sectional understanding of 
the plans of selected intra-EU migrants during the months before the EU referendum. Based 
on the above findings, we expect a strong inclination toward naturalisation and legal integration 
in general, since naturalisation strategies based on ‘mere eligibility’ might be enhanced by the 
possibility of a Brexit. It is important to reiterate at this point that even when our survey 
question inquired about plans under a no-Brexit scenario, these plans may still be influenced 
by the uncertainty and anxiety caused by the broader discursive moment of the EU referendum. 
We test this assumption later through a multivariate analysis. 
The distribution of answers to our three central survey questions is presented in Figure 
3, broken down by nationality groups. These results confirm our initial expectation for strong 
legal integration plans. We find that 35% of respondents were considering applying for PRC 
and 33% for British citizenship as a 5-year plan ‘regardless of the EU referendum,’ while 5% 
of respondents already held a PRC and were planning to remain in the UK without planning to 
naturalise (Figure 3A). Only 9% were planning to leave the UK within 5 years (6% to ‘return’ 
to their origin countries and 3% to ‘re-migrate’ to a third country), while 18% considered 
remaining in the UK relying on their DPR rights (i.e., without legal integration plans). In case 
of a Brexit vote (i.e., as a more short-term strategy), 48% would opt for PRC and only 21% for 
naturalisation, while a slightly higher proportion than otherwise would re-migrate (6%) and 
only 14% would not take any proactive measure of legal integration (Figure 3B). Overall, under 
both scenarios posited in our survey, combined legal integration plans amount to 68–69% 
(Figures 3A and 3B), and general plans for naturalisation ‘at any point in the future’ show a 
comparable result of 65% (Figure 3C). 
Shifts between the two legal integration action-plans – PRC and naturalisation – under 
the different scenarios can therefore be better explained through the ‘eligibility’ hypothesis, 
assuming that fewer respondents would be eligible for naturalisation as British citizens in the 
immediate aftermath of a Brexit vote (especially since PRC is now a prerequisite for a 
citizenship application). If we examine the direction of individual changes, rather than the 
aggregate statistics presented in Figures 3A and 3B, we find that 75% of those who would 
change their stated 5-year plans away from naturalisation in the more immediate event of a 
Brexit vote would change to PRC; conversely, of those who said they would change their five-
year plans away from PRC, 57% would change to naturalisation and 36% would, or rather 
could, take ‘no action.’ Arguably, this is also reflected in the much greater increase in actual 
PRC applications than in naturalisations over the past two years that we saw earlier in Figure 
1. 
Some of the differences between nationality groups can also be interpreted as 
supportive of the eligibility hypothesis. Hungarian and Romanian respondents in particular 
stand out in Figures 3A and 3B. Hungarians show the greatest overall shift from naturalisation 
to PRC plans in case of Brexit, while Romanians are the only group to exhibit a significant 
shift toward ‘no action’ under a Brexit scenario. Considering that Hungarians and Romanians 
in our sample have the lowest average lengths of residence in the UK (4 years 3 months and 3 
years 9 months, respectively – see Table S2 in SM) and, furthermore, that despite their time of 
arrival, many Romanian respondents may not have had access to NINo and formal employment 
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Figure 3: Legal integration plans - distribution of answers to three survey questions, 
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until 2014 (and therefore are not eligible for a PRC), their patterns of likely change between 
the available strategies under the two scenarios become easier to interpret in line with the 
eligibility hypothesis. 
At the same time, the general differences in attitudes toward legal integration between 
the various nationality groups also reinforce the findings highlighted in the previous section: 
German and Portuguese nationals show the least interest in legal integration across all 
scenarios; conversely, not only do Hungarians and Romanians declare the most interest in 
naturalisation (74% and 75%, respectively (Figure 3C)), but their actual naturalisation patterns 
even before the EU Referendum showed the strongest and most stable alignment with the ‘mere 
eligibility’ hypothesis, as can be inferred from the correlation coefficients shown in Figure 2.
   
Socio-demographic and interpersonal determinants of legal integration preferences 
Having established the strong overall preference for legal integration strategies in 
descriptive terms, the next step is to examine what factors may influence these preferences. To 
do so, we first performed a multinomial logistic regression on a dependent variable grouping 
5-year plans in the three broader action-categories of ‘exit,’ DPR, and legal integration, with 
the latter being the reference category (Model 1, Table 2). Those who already held a PRC and 
were not planning either ‘exit’ or naturalisation were excluded from this part of the analysis, 
due to their different legal status. Second, we ran a binomial logistic regression on the variable 
assessing whether the respondent is planning to naturalise ‘at any point in the future’ (Model 
2, Table 2). We discuss relevant results from these regression models in parallel.  
The used measure of age proved significant in respect to mobility, with those under 40 
being around twice as likely to prefer ‘exit’ than legal integration in the medium term, even 
when all other variables were held constant (M1; OR=1/0.51). Young adults, we could 
conclude, are more likely to be mobile than the middle-aged, as would be expected based on 
our knowledge of the life cycle of social ties in migratory settings (Ryan 2016) and 
psychosocial development in general (Erikson and Erikson 1997). Age, however, does not 
seem to have an influence on the legal aspects of integration. 
Education level has a more ambiguous effect. Those educated to university or 
postgraduate level are more than twice less likely to say that they are planning to undergo legal 
integration than to leave the country, compared to those educated to secondary-school level. 
This finding gives partial support to observations that highly skilled individuals tend to take 
‘fuller advantage of free mobility within the EU’ and show ‘less attachment to a particular 
country’ (Landesmann, Leitner, and Mara 2015, 23, see also Drinkwater and Garapich 2015, 
Dustmann and Weiss 2007). However, the same effect stands for those with 
vocational/professional qualifications below secondary level, which probably signals that those 
in more elementary trade occupations see their migratory careers as similarly transitory. Those 
with post-secondary/further education degrees, on the other hand, are the only ones to be 
significantly more inclined to legal integration than to rely on DPR rights, compared to those 
educated at secondary level (M1; OR=1.92). 
Having children favours legal integration by contrast to both ‘exit’ and DPR options, 
as well as with respect to general naturalisation plans. Those with children are 61% more likely 
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to plan naturalisation at one point in the future (M2; OR=1.61), 46% more likely to undergo 
some form of legal integration within five years than rely on DPR (M1; OR=1.46), and 78% 
more likely to legally integrate than to leave the UK within five years (M1; OR=1.78). 
However, parental status is also highly correlated with having ‘accessed welfare benefits,’ 
which in the majority of cases represents childcare-related benefits (see Table S3 in SM), and 
the latter variable has an even stronger legally integrative effect with respect to medium-term 
mobility plans (M1; OR=1.99) and indefinite naturalisation intentions (M2; OR=1.64). Thus, 
those with children are more likely to plan to stay in the UK and eventually apply for citizenship 
but are even more likely to do so if they have engaged with the British welfare state. 
With respect to the length of residence, we generally find that those who have lived in 
the UK for over 9 years are less likely to opt for legal integration than those with less than 3 
years in the country. Although this observation does not lend itself to a straight-forward 
explanation, it may highlight that those who have arrived most recently are more sceptical 
about the ability of EU-derived rights to safeguard their access to long-term residence, a 
possible effect of the political climate (Bolognani and Erdal 2017, Favell 2013). 
Table 2: Socio-demographic and interpersonal determinants of legal integration 
(multinomial and logistic regression models, odds ratios) 
 
M1: Legal integration  
in next 5 years 
M2: Naturalisation  
in future 
 Vs: Exit Vs: DPR Vs: Not Planning 
Female (d) 1.066 1.034 0.963 
Aged under 40 (d) 0.506** 0.841 1.059 
Education: Postgraduate 0.394** 1.231 1.186 
Education: Undergraduate 0.478* 1.335 0.966 
Education: Post-secondary/Further ed. 1.083 1.920** 1.302 
Education: Vocational/Professional 0.475* 1.108 0.923 
Married/in civil partnership (d) 1.056 1.390+ 0.815 
Has children (d) 1.784* 1.457* 1.612** 
Years in UK: 9+ 0.686 0.566** 0.590* 
Years in UK: 6– 9 0.863 1.049 0.630* 
Years in UK: 3– 6 0.960 0.877 1.061 
Economic unit: Employed full-time 1.703+ 1.086 0.907 
Economic unit: One member full-time 1.615 0.802 0.876 
Economic unit: At least one self-employed 1.701 1.141 1.317 
Nationality: Germany 0.195*** 0.109*** 0.232*** 
Nationality: Portugal 0.333** 0.323*** 0.332*** 
Nationality: Hungary 0.343*** 0.686 1.054 
Nationality: Romania 0.431** 2.018+ 1.253 
Has accessed welfare benefits (d) 1.989** 1.094 1.637** 
Uses English at work (d) 1.353 2.001*** 2.355*** 
Uses English at home (d) 1.759* 1.421+ 2.599*** 
Nagelkerke R-square .187 .143 
N 1,057 1,057 
Notes: Dichotomous independent variables are marked with ‘d’, while non-marked variables should be read 
against the relevant reference category: ‘secondary education’; ‘has less than 3 years in UK’; ‘Economic 
unit in part-time work or inactive’; ‘Nationality: Poland’. 
M1: Chi-sq (42) = 168.435, p<.001; M2: Chi-sq (21) = 115.299, p<.001 
M1 was rescaled for underdispersion based on the deviance statistic (φ=0.72) 
+p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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The employment status of the ‘economic unit’ did not prove significant; however, 
speaking English in a workplace environment has a strong legally integrative effect both by 
contrast to DPR in the medium term (M1; OR=2.00) and with respect to indefinite 
naturalisation intentions (M2; OR=2.36). A similar analysis (not reported here) on respondents’ 
individual employment status, as opposed to that of the ‘economic unit,’ highlights that 
employment only gains significance if it takes place in an environment where English is spoken 
and is thus conducive to the enhancement of bridging social capital (see also our related 
analysis on the Polish sample, in McGhee, Moreh, and Vlachantoni 2017). This finding adds 
further nuance to the straightforward assumption that ‘migrants with full-time jobs or self-
employed migrants tend to favour permanent settlement’ (Landesmann, Leitner, and Mara 
2015, 22). Using English at home similarly makes one 2.6 times more likely to declare 
naturalisation plans at one point in the future (M2; OR=2.60) and 76% more likely to be 
planning legal integration in the medium term as opposed to leaving the UK (M1; OR=1.76). 
It is also less likely that those using English at home rely on DPR; however, the statistical effect 
in this case is not significant at the .05 level. 
Finally, the effect of nationality shows a somewhat-complex picture when accounting 
for other variables but essentially confirms what emerged from the descriptive analysis (Figure 
3). As the largest group of intra-EU migrants in the UK (and in our sample), Polish nationals 
were designated as the reference category, and, compared to them, all other nationality groups 
proved significantly more likely to be planning to leave the UK than to legally integrate (M1). 
At the same time, German and Portuguese nationals are 9 and 3 times less inclined, 
respectively, to say that they would undergo legal integration within five years than to rely on 
DPR (M1) and less likely to plan naturalisation at any time in the future (M2). Romanians are 
an interesting case; although compared to Poles, their likelihood to prefer legal integration over 
DPR in the medium term is not statistically significant at the p<.05 level in Model 1, if we do 
not control for the two ‘use of English’ variables, the effect is significant (p=0.024) and shows 
Romanians as over twice as likely to plan legal integration. Overall, these effects support the 
hypothesis that those from the pre-2004 member states are less attracted by integration within 
the UK’s legal structures, while Romanian migrants, under certain circumstances, are 
particularly open to legal integration, perhaps motivated by a desire to enhance their civic status 
in the face of perceived discrimination (Paraschivescu 2016).  
To conclude, several socio-demographic factors identified in the broader literature as 
conducive to socially emplacing migrants – such as parental ties, linguistic exposure, time spent 
in the UK (albeit counterintuitively), or education level (Dustmann and Weiss 2007, 
Landesmann, Leitner, and Mara 2015, McGhee, Trevena, and Heath 2015, Ryan et al. 2009, 
White 2011) – have proved significant in determining stated plans of legal integration in the 
medium term and naturalisation in the more distant future. This finding is important, since 
these factors would not necessarily play an important role in the mobile lives of EU movers, 
were it not for pre-Brexit practical failings in the lived experience of EU citizenship (Favell 
2013, Graeber 2016). As such, they intimate that legal integration preferences may be rooted 
in broader relational and motivational structures than in the UK’s potential departure from the 
EU. 
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The Brexit effect on legal integration 
Having established the relevance of certain sociodemographic factors in shaping legal 
integration preferences, this section aims to assess more directly the degree to which Brexit 
affects practices and aspirations of legal integration. For this purpose, we expand the regression 
models discussed above with four variables of interest. Table 3 presents regression coefficients 
for these additional variables, while also controlling for the socio-demographic and 
interpersonal variables included in Table 2. 
As the literature review established, original intentions behind migration can affect 
return and settlement practices (Luthra, Platt, and Salamońska 2016, Mara and Landesmann 
2013). Although capturing the complexity of original intentions is never straighforward and 
always difficult to operationalise, any particular measure of intentionality is expected to 
highlight that long-term settlement is at least partly driven by long-term settlement plans at the 
time of initial migration. In our model we expect that those who had migrated for socio-
political reasons, rather than merely to achieve an economic aim, had already been determined 
to settle in the UK and undergo legal integration (see SM3 for a derivation of the variable). 
One fifth of our sample had assessed ‘socio-political’ factors as relevant to their decision to 
migrate to the UK instead of another EU country (19%; see Table 1), and we find that having 
had socio-political migration reasons significantly increases the likelihood of legal integration 
plans: those with socio-political migration reasons are 82% more likely to be planning 
naturalisation in the future (M4; OR=1.82), 56% more likely to take measures of legal 
integration in the next five years instead of relying on DPR (M3; OR=1.56), and 2.4 times more 
likely to legally integrate than to be planning to leave the UK in the medium term (M3; 
OR=2.39). 
Another variable measured the effect of self-declared civic status in respect to British 
citizenship. Rather than a reliable measure of eligibility for naturalisation, this variable denotes 
awareness of, and consequently, interest in eligibility requirements. We indeed find that self-
Table 3: Further factors affecting legal integration (multinomial and logistic 
regression models, odds ratios) 
All non-students from selected EU countries 
Model 3: 
Legal integration in next 
5 years 
Model 4:  
Naturalisation in 
future 
 Vs. Exit Vs. DPR Vs. Not Planning 
‘Socio-political’ migration reasons (d) 2.386* 1.561* 1.822** 
UK citizenship: Eligible 1.086 1.068 0.987 
UK citizenship: NK (the requirements) 0.657+ 0.586* 0.529** 
Feels anxious about Brexit (d) 1.828** 1.514** 1.593** 
Changed plans in case of Brexit (d) 0.122*** 0.069*** 0.308*** 
Nagelkerke R-square .407 .243 
N 1,057 1,057 
Notes: All the independent variables included in Table 2 are also controlled for. 
The reference category for the non-dichotomous variable is: ‘UK citizenship: Not eligible’. 
M3: Chi-sq (52) = 408.435, p<.001; M4: Chi-sq (26) = 204.579, p<.001 
M3 was rescaled for underdispersion based on the deviance statistic (φ=0.60) 
+p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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declared eligibility does not significantly determine one’s plans but that awareness of the 
requirements significantly increases the likelihood of individual preferences for legal 
integration: those avowedly unaware of the requirements are almost twice less likely to hold 
future naturalisation plans (M4; OR=0.53), and over 70% less likely to plan legal integration 
than DPR in the medium term (M3; OR=0.59), than those aware of their ineligibility for 
naturalisation within one year.  
This finding could mean that an initial interest in one’s legal options is conducive to 
legal integration plans, although we cannot unambiguously resolve the question of causation 
between the two: we have no way of checking whether the political climate of EU Referendum 
debates actually stirred that interest or whether it truly preceded the anxieties caused by the 
possibility of the UK leaving the EU. However, it is informative to note that when running the 
same regression model on the Brexit scenario as the outcome variable (not shown here), 
unawareness of eligibility criteria loses its statistical significance, while actual self-declared 
eligibility significantly increases, by a measure of two, the likelihood of legal integration over 
‘no action’ (OR=1.96, p=.007). In other words, in case of Brexit, those who are unaware of the 
criteria for naturalisation are no longer less likely to opt for legal integration than those who 
are aware of the criteria and know that are ineligible for naturalisation. We can interpret this 
finding in line with our earlier conclusions that Brexit seems to have had a strong legally 
integrative effect on those who had previously not planned legal integration measures but not 
necessarily on those whose plans had already been shaped. 
 As a dispositional measure of the EU Referendum’s psychological impact, we included 
a variable testing the effect of Brexit anxiety on reported legal integration plans (see Table S3 
in SM). Overall, 43% of respondents were feeling anxious about Brexit, and this anxiety 
significantly increases both medium-term legal integration plans regardless of the EU 
Referendum (M3) and indefinite future naturalisation intentions (M4), even when all other 
variables are accounted for. We could interpret this situation as signalling that Brexit’s 
discursive context may have also left its imprint on planning for a future in a no-Brexit scenario. 
However, the direction of causality remains a black box in this case too, and it may be that 
those who already hold legal integration plans are more likely to be concerned about Brexit, 
rather than the other way around. 
A more direct measure of Brexit’s potential effect on professed future plans is to assess 
whether planned actions under the Brexit scenario differ from planned actions in a medium-
term no-Brexit scenario. As shown in Table 3, those who change their plans in case of Brexit 
are three times less likely to have planned to naturalise at one point in the future and in the 
medium term eight times more likely to have planned ‘exit’ (OR=1/0.12) and fifteen times 
more likely to have been planning DPR as opposed to legal integration (OR=1/0.07). In other 
words, those entertaining legal integration plans (i.e., over two thirds of our sample) are less 
likely to have their plans changed because of Brexit. Their motivations must have at least in 
part been motivated by factors other than the EU referendum, and Brexit may primarily 
accelerate their legal integration apace with increased anxiety about the negative effects of a 
foreseeable Brexit vote. 
Finally, it is important to consider whether those who are planning to apply for a PRC 
do so with the aim of naturalising as British citizens in the future. We could hardly talk of a 
‘return of citizenship’ otherwise. We have seen from the administrative data that the EU 
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Referendum’s actual outcome has had a very noticeable influence on legal integration 
practices: primarily on PRC applications, but PRC is now a requirement for naturalisation, and 
citizenship applications themselves reached their highest levels during 2017 (Figure 1). We 
have also seen from the descriptive statistics of our survey data that the relative majority (35%) 
of respondents were planning PRC in the next five years regardless of the EU referendum, and 
almost half (48%) would apply for a PRC in case of a Brexit vote (Figure 3). The difference 
between the two scenarios, as we have noted, is due partly to the fact that 75% of those planning 
naturalisation in the next five years would, in case of Brexit, first apply for a PRC. Apart from 
this latter group, however, the question remains whether the PRC – a legal tool still regulated 
by EU law – is an end in itself or merely a transition to full citizenship. We attempt to elucidate 
this through Models 5 and 6 (Table 4) on a subset of our sample, including only those planning 
either PRC or DPR in the next five years (N=656) and in case of a Brexit vote (N=763), 
respectively.  
We find that those planning for PRC, as opposed to DPR, in the next five years are 2.7 
times more inclined to be planning naturalisation at some point in the future (M5) and that 
those with similar plans in case of Brexit are 3.7 time more likely to plan naturalisation in the 
future. When speaking of legal integration, we could therefore conclude that we see the return 
of citizenship as a legal status to be aimed at through formalising one’s permanent residence 
rights. As noted earlier, while the latter is still a process derived from EU legal norms meant to 
reduce any assimilatory expectations raised by member states, naturalisation imposes the full 
set of civic integration requirements (Goodman 2012, Joppke 2017) through which EU 
‘movers’ are indeed ‘turning into immigrants’ (Favell 2013, 57). 
Conclusions 
Combining a statistical analysis of data from secondary administrative sources and an online 
survey, this article examined patterns of legal integration among intra-EU migrants in the UK 
as a broader process predating the EU Referendum and assessed Brexit’s effect on attitudes to 
legal integration. It has four main findings. First, we argue that national citizenship is the main 
legal mechanism by which intra-EU migrants seek to integrate within the UK’s legal 
framework and that this was the case even before the EU Referendum. We show that 
naturalisation intentions are often shaped by the mere entitlement to apply for citizenship and 
that initial reasons for migration and interest in legal integration options, leading to a higher 
awareness of such options, are also factors driving a preference for legal integration. This 
Table 4: The relationship between permanent residence and citizenship (logistic 
regression models, odds ratios) 
 
Model 5: 
Legal integration in 
next 5 years 
Model 6:  
Naturalisation in 
future 
5–year plan: PRC vs. DPR 2.704***  
Brexit action: PRC vs. No action  3.660*** 
Nagelkerke R-square .200 .217 
N 656 763 
Notes: All the independent variables included in Table 2 are also controlled for. 
+p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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finding substantiates Graeber’s (2016) observations concerning the ‘reincentivizing of 
citizenship’ in intra-EU migration. 
Second, the article highlights Brexit’s strong but differential effect on legal integration 
plans. Anxiety about Brexit is strongly associated with plans for legal integration, even in a 
scenario in which the UK remains in the EU and when other socio-demographic and attitudinal 
variables are held constant. Yet, as discussed, the causality in the relationship is hard to 
determine. Overall, Brexit affects disproportionately those who had previously planned to rely 
on EU citizenship as the main guarantor of their long-term residence and settlement rights.  
Third, our analysis highlights significant differences between the selected nationality 
groups in respect to both practices and attitudes toward legal integration and, consequently, in 
Brexit’s effect on their plans and actions. Those from pre-2004 EU member states are much 
less likely to have planned to legally integrate before the EU Referendum and thus see their 
plans as affected by Brexit to a greater degree. Findings concerning differences between 
nationality groups, however, must be considered in the context of our limited and unbalanced 
nationality sample. Nevertheless, they are useful for helping formulate new hypotheses for a 
more structured comparative analysis. 
 Fourth, several socio-demographic variables described in the broader migration 
literature as shaping migrants’ social ‘embedding’ (Ryan 2018), ‘emplacement’ (Glick Schiller 
and Çağlar 2013) or ‘anchoring’ (Grzymala-Kazlowska 2016) in countries of residence have 
proved significant in shaping attitudes toward legal integration. On the one hand, this finding, 
again, signals that preferences for legal integration are partly rooted in broader social and 
interpersonal processes beyond the Brexit factor. On the other hand, it highlights an intersection 
between legal and social forms of integration that needs further elaboration and 
disambiguation. 
These findings make a significant contribution to beginning to grasp the complexity of 
integrative processes in times of radical sociolegal transformation. They place Brexit within a 
broader set of phenomena that could be summed up as sociolegal de-Europeanization: a loss 
of faith in the strength of supranational rights, materialised in both bottom-up and top-down 
attitudes and behaviours. Thus, this article makes a significant early contribution to the 
understandings of these phenomena. 
The sociolegal aspects of integration are becoming ever more important following the 
Brexit vote, and there are several dimensions in this respect that our research was not equipped 
to address. We will highlight but two. Future research must examine further the qualitative 
lived experience of naturalisation and national citizenship as balances between providing a 
legal ‘anchor’ to achieving ‘socio-psychological stability’ while leaving open ‘various 
possibilities’ (Grzymala-Kazlowska 2018, 255) and serving the more assimilatory purposes of 
‘integration through citizenship’ (Hansen 2003, 89). From a legal perspective, we also need a 
better understanding of how the citizenship laws of origin countries – particularly with respect 
to holding dual nationality in a non-EU country, which the UK becomes following Brexit – 
may affect migrants’ attitudes and practices. In effect, these two research directions will 
involve developing a more unified focus on the stratification of legal transnationalism within 
the web of transnational social and interpersonal relationships. 
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APPENDICES: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Table S1: Pre-Referendum Survey and Labour Force Survey comparative demographic and socio-economic statistics 
  Pre-Ref survey (Mar-Jun 2016) LFS (Apr-Jun 2016) 
  Germany Portugal Hungary Romania Poland Total 
N 
Germany Portugal Hungary Romania Poland Total 
N 
  (N=72) (N=120) (N=128) (N=128) (N=965) (N=1,413) (N=138) (N=223) (N=106) (N=296) (N=996) (N=1,759) 
Female (d) 67% 55% 69% 48% 67% 64% 910 64% 54% 58% 51% 53% 54% 949 
Age (cont.): Mean (min-max; SD) 
36 (24-53; 
8) 
37 (22-64; 
9) 
38 (19-65; 
10) 
35 (20-59; 
9) 
38 (19-65; 
9) 
38 (19-65; 
9) 
1,413 
43 (16-81; 
13) 
40 (16-82; 
13) 
37 (16-77; 
10) 
33 (16-76; 
9) 
35 (17-87; 
10) 
36 (16-97; 
11) 
1,759 
Age group: Under 30 22% 19% 22% 29% 16% 19% 261 14% 21% 21% 41% 27% 27% 474 
Age group: 30-39 49% 46% 36% 41% 46% 45% 633 28% 32% 44% 40% 49% 44% 767 
Age group: 40-49 22% 26% 29% 24% 26% 26% 366 28% 30% 23% 15% 15% 19% 327 
Age group: Over 50 7% 9% 13% 5% 11% 11% 148 30% 17% 12% 5% 8% 11% 191 
Education: Vocational or 
professional  
6% 3% 6% 4% 15% 11% 162 19% 43% 30% 26% 30% 30% 281 
Education: Secondary  3% 18% 19% 28% 40% 33% 473 5% 14% 20% 12% 16% 15% 138 
Education: Post-secondary further 14% 10% 27% 12% 15% 15% 212 5% 1% 13% 10% 15% 12% 111 
Education: Undergraduate higher 22% 38% 36% 38% 12% 19% 266 22% 26% 28% 37% 21% 25% 236 
Education: Postgraduate higher 56% 26% 11% 15% 15% 18% 253 49% 15% 9% 14% 19% 19% 181 
Econ: Employed full time 75% 65% 67% 55% 58% 60% 844 38% 57% 60% 58% 60% 57% 1010 
Econ: Employed part-time 7% 12% 16% 12% 16% 15% 208 18% 15% 6% 5% 14% 12% 215 
Econ: Self-employed 10% 8% 6% 16% 9% 9% 130 18% 6% 12% 17% 12% 13% 220 
Econ: Inactive 6% 11% 6% 9% 12% 11% 152 25% 22% 22% 20% 15% 18% 314 
Socio-Economic status: I 56% 30% 7% 12% 5% 14% 138 27% 10% 8% 5% 3% 6% 98 
Socio-Economic status: II 16% 22% 6% 9% 7% 11% 112 26% 12% 17% 15% 10% 13% 203 
Socio-Economic status: III 19% 13% 12% 6% 4% 9% 87 13% 5% 8% 7% 8% 8% 121 
Socio-Economic status: IV 2% 3% 5% 9% 6% 8% 80 15% 8% 10% 19% 13% 13% 210 
Socio-Economic status: V+VI 6% 18% 23% 21% 23% 30% 296 14% 35% 31% 28% 36% 33% 516 
Socio-Economic status: VII 0% 14% 24% 11% 23% 28% 283 4% 29% 27% 25% 30% 27% 428 
Married, in civil partnership, 
cohabitating (d) 
42% 33% 58% 56% 67% 45% 638 70% 60% 75% 79% 77% 74% 1308 
Children: has children 26% 36% 29% 34% 58% 50% 705 44% 63% 42% 44% 55% 53% 925 
Time in UK: <3y 29% 55% 40% 52% 15% 24% 345 12% 14% 14% 41% 11% 17% 288 
Time in UK: 3–6y 13% 16% 37% 25% 22% 23% 324 11% 20% 38% 21% 18% 19% 333 
Time in UK: 6–9y 19% 9% 13% 13% 26% 22% 306 10% 14% 20% 23% 17% 17% 298 
Time in UK: 9y< 39% 18% 10% 8% 37% 30% 427 67% 52% 28% 15% 55% 47% 822 
Notes: 
All percentages are in respect to column and variable totals (i.e. remaining differences to 100% are due to ‘missing,’ ‘other,’ and ‘prefer not to say’ responses). 
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Socio-economic status is based on NS_SEC classification: (I) Higher managerial, administrative, and professional occupations, (II) Lower managerial, administrative, and professional occupations, (III) Intermediate occupations, (IV) 
Small employers and own account workers, (V) Lower supervisory and technical occupations, (VI) Semi-routine occupations, and (VII) Routine occupations. 
The LFS national groups are based on the NATOX7 variable. Students are excluded from both samples.  
29 
 
 
 
Table S2: Descriptive statistics of survey sample, by nationality groups 
  
Germany  
(N=72) 
Portugal  
(N=120) 
Hungary  
(N=128) 
Romania  
(N=128) 
Poland  
(N=965) 
Total 
(N=1,413) 
% N 
Female 67% 55% 69% 48% 67% 64% 910 
Age (cont.): Mean (SD) 36 (8) 37 (9) 38 (10) 35 (9) 38 (9) 38 (9) 
Education: Postgraduate 56% 26% 11% 15% 15% 18% 253 
Education: Undergraduate 22% 38% 36% 38% 12% 19% 266 
Education: Post-secondary/Further 
ed. 
14% 10% 27% 12% 15% 
15% 212 
Education: Secondary  3% 18% 19% 28% 40% 33% 473 
Education: Vocational/Professional 6% 3% 6% 4% 15% 11% 162 
Married/in civil partnership 42% 33% 24% 37% 51% 45% 638 
Children: all in UK 26% 33% 23% 23% 55% 46% 648 
Children: some/all not in UK 0% 3% 6% 11% 3% 4% 57 
No children 72% 63% 69% 63% 40% 48% 677 
Time in UK (cont.): Mean (SD) 
8y7m 
(7y4m) 
4y6m 
(4y7m) 
4y3m 
(3y1m) 
3y9m 
(3y5m) 
7y2m 
(3y5m) 
6y6m (4y) 
Time in UK: <3y 29% 55% 40% 52% 15% 24% 345 
Time in UK: 3–6y 13% 16% 37% 25% 22% 23% 324 
Time in UK: 6–9y 19% 9% 13% 13% 26% 22% 306 
Time in UK: 9+y 39% 18% 10% 8% 37% 30% 427 
Econ: Employed full time 75% 65% 67% 55% 58% 60% 844 
Econ: Employed part-time 7% 12% 16% 12% 16% 15% 208 
Econ: Self-employed 10% 8% 6% 16% 9% 9% 130 
Econ: Inactive 6% 11% 6% 9% 12% 11% 152 
Partner Econ: single 36% 36% 39% 38% 29% 32% 451 
Partner Econ: full time 49% 43% 43% 30% 45% 43% 611 
Partner Econ: part-time 3% 7% 4% 7% 5% 5% 73 
Partner Econ: Self-employed 6% 1% 5% 10% 7% 7% 93 
Partner Econ: Inactive 4% 7% 3% 4% 7% 6% 87 
Has accessed benefits 19% 38% 44% 25% 64% 54% 760 
Uses English at work 83% 86% 91% 84% 75% 78% 1109 
Uses English at home 61% 35% 21% 26% 14% 20% 282 
‘Socio-political’ factors as important 
reason for migration to UK 
3% 13% 18% 27% 20% 19% 265 
UK citizenship: Eligible 50% 24% 28% 34% 45% 41% 576 
UK citizenship: DK (the 
requirements) 
17% 42% 13% 30% 27% 
27% 381 
UK citizenship: Not eligible 31% 32% 59% 34% 18% 25% 351 
Personal effect of Brexit: Negative 82% 54% 61% 53% 56% 57% 809 
Personal effect of Brexit: None 10% 19% 16% 24% 28% 25% 349 
Personal effect of Brexit: Positive 0% 2% 3% 7% 4% 4% 57 
Brexit likelihood: Unlikely 25% 28% 39% 29% 21% 24% 340 
Brexit likelihood: Equal likelihood 49% 35% 37% 44% 52% 48% 682 
Brexit likelihood: Likely 25% 33% 21% 26% 25% 26% 363 
Changed plans in Brexit scenario 51% 32% 32% 31% 16% 22% 307 
Note: Percentages are in respect to totals (i.e. remaining differences to 100% are due to ‘missing,’ ‘other,’ and ‘prefer not 
to say’ responses) 
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Table S3: Survey questions and derived variables 
Survey questions: Response  options (R): Derived variables: 
Regardless of the EU referendum, what is your most 
likely plan for the next 5 years?  
(1) Move to a non-EU country (not your country of origin/citizenship) 
(2) Move to another EU country (not your country of origin/citizenship) 
(3) Move to your country of origin/citizenship 
(4) Remain in the UK and apply for a permanent residence certificate (for 
yourself and your family, if applicable) 
(5) Remain in the UK and apply for British citizenship (for yourself and your 
family, if applicable) 
(6) Remain in the UK without any concrete plan/take no action 
5-year plan/Brexit action: 
(1) Exit (R=1–3) 
(1.1) Re-migration (R=1–2) 
(1.2) Return (R=3) 
(2) Civic integration (R=4–5) 
(2.1) PRC (R=4) 
(2.2) Citizenship (R=5) 
(3) Derived permanent residence (R=6) 
If the UK votes to leave the EU, what will your most 
likely action be? 
What language do you use most often at work (if 
applicable)? 
(1) My native language 
(2) English (not my native language) 
(3) Another language 
(4) Not applicable 
Speaking English in a work-place environment: 
(1) Yes (R=2) 
(2) All else 
What language do you use most often at home? 
(1) My native language 
(2) English (not my native language) 
(3) Another language 
Speaking English at home: 
(1) Yes (R=2) 
(2) All else 
Have you applied, or are you currently (or within 
one year from now) eligible to apply for British 
citizenship? 
(1) I have applied for British citizenship (Not included in the analysis) 
(2) I am eligible to apply 
(3) I am not eligible to apply 
(4) Do not know (the eligibility requirements) 
Eligibility for citizenship 
(1) Eligible 
(2) NK (the requirements) 
(3) Not eligible 
On a 1-to-5 scale where 1 is not at all important and 
5 is very important, how important were the factors 
below in your decision to move to the UK instead of 
another EU country? 
 
(If you feel that any statement is NOT TRUE of the 
UK, tick Not true of UK) 
(a) Higher wages 
(b) Better business opportunities 
(c) More jobs available 
(d) Better study opportunities (for yourself) 
(e) Better schooling for your children 
(f) Better medical care 
(g) More political/civic freedom 
(h) Better social benefits 
(i) Cheaper living costs 
(j) English language learning/development 
(k) Partner or family member already in UK 
(l) Other factors 
(0) Not true of UK 
(recoded as 1) 
(1) Not at all important 
(2)  
(3) 
(4) 
(5) Very important 
‘Social’ reasons for choosing the UK: 
(1) Important (e+f+g+h)>= 16 
(2) Less important 
 
Variable derived following a Principal Components 
Analysis (see SM2) 
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Since arriving to the UK, have you or anyone in your 
family received any social benefits or services? (See 
examples below) 
(please tick as appropriate) 
(a) Jobseeker's Allowance; (b) Income support; (c) Housing benefit; (d) Council 
Tax Benefit; (e) Working Tax Credit; (f) Child Tax Credit; (g) Employment and 
Support Allowance (ESA); (h) Universal Credit; (i) Child benefit; (j) Maternity 
/paternity pay; (k) Personal Independence Payment (PIP); (l) Invalid Carer's 
Allowance; (m) UK state pension; (n) Free healthcare service; (o) Student loan; 
(p) Free translation /interpretation services; (q) Legal aid; (r) Other 
Has accessed benefits: 
(1) Yes (Any (a)–(l)) 
(2) No 
How likely do you think it is that the UK will leave 
the EU after the Referendum? 
(0) Do not know; (1) Very unlikely; (2) More unlikely; (3) There is an equal 
probability; (4) More likely; (5) Very likely  
Brexit anxiety: 
(1) Anxious about Brexit (Likelihood R=3–5 with 
Effect R=1–2) 
(2) All else 
What effect would it have on your (and your 
family’s) life if the UK chose to leave the EU? 
(0) Do not know; (1) Very negative; (2) Somewhat negative; (3) None; (4) 
Somewhat positive; (5) Very positive 
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PCA: Principal Components Analysis procedure for the ‘Socio-political’ reasons for choosing the UK 
variable 
A Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was run on 10 items in a question bloc that measured respondents’ 
reasons for moving to the United Kingdom (UK) instead of another EU country: (1) Higher wages, (2) Better 
business opportunities, (3) More jobs available, (4) Better study opportunities (for yourself), (5) Better 
schooling for your children, (6) Better medical care, (7) More political/civic freedom, (8) Better social 
benefits, (9) English language learning/development, and (10) Partner or family member already in the UK. 
The analysis was undertaken on a sample including only non-students from nine national groups (N=1,526). 
Answers were measured on a scale of 1 (not at all important) to 5 (very important), with an additional option 
of ‘Not true of UK,’ which was recoded as 1 (not at all important) for this analysis. Only cases with valid 
answers on all items were included in the PCA (N=1,496). Conceptually, items 1–3 were conceived to denote 
economic reasons, items 4 and 9 educational reasons, and items 5–8 and 10 reflect social, political and personal 
motivations. 
The distribution of the responses’ means and standard deviations is presented in Table S4 in order of 
importance. As we can see, jobs availability was the most important and least divisive (SD=1.17) reason on 
average, followed by English language learning/development opportunities and higher wages. Having a 
partner or family member already in the UK and better schooling for children had the highest standard 
deviations, as they denote personal circumstances that may not apply to everyone.  
Table S4: Reasons for moving to the UK instead of another EU country 
How important were the factors below in your decision to move to the 
UK instead of another EU country?  
(1 = not at all important, 5 = very important) 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
More jobs available 4.17 1.170 
English language learning/development 4.09 1.211 
Higher wages 4.04 1.220 
Better business opportunities 3.34 1.472 
Better study opportunities (for yourself) 3.20 1.496 
More political/civic freedom 3.01 1.485 
Better schooling for your children 2.82 1.621 
Better medical care 2.60 1.434 
Partner or family member already in the UK 2.59 1.804 
Better social benefits 2.43 1.451 
Valid N (listwise)=1,496; Min=1, Max=5 
An initial PCA was undertaken on the ten items, with three items proving unsuitable and excluded from the 
analysis: first, having a “partner or family member already in the UK” did not correlate highly enough with 
any other item; second, “English language learning/development” and “better study opportunities” loaded on 
all extracted components (both when 2 or 3 was extracted), failing to achieve a simple structure that would 
aid interpretation. The remaining seven items were suitable for PCA: the overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
measure was .81, with individual KMO measures all being greater than .77; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was 
statistically significant (χ² (21) = 2329.89, p<.001). Two components were extracted and retained, with 
eigenvalues greater than 1 and satisfying interpretability criteria. The two components explained 58% of the 
total variance. Due to correlation between the components, an oblique rotation method was employed (Direct 
oblimin). The two extracted items were consistent with the initial conceptual assumption, with social-political 
reasons loading strongly on the first component and economic-career reasons having high loadings on the 
second component (see Table S5 for rotated solutions). We also conducted separate reliability analyses on the 
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two components, with the “socio-political reasons” subscale proving reliable for our purposes (Cronbach’s α 
= .75), while the reliability of the “economic reasons” subscale is questionable (Cronbach’s α = .64), although 
it must be taken into consideration that the component consists of only three items (see Cortina 1993).  
Table S5: Results from a PCA of seven questionnaire items relating to reason for moving to the UK 
instead of another EU country 
Rotated component matrices Pattern Matrix Structure Matrix 
Reasons: Socio-political Economic Socio-political Economic  
Better medical care .862 -.087 .824 .286 
More political/civic freedom .738 .011 .742 .330 
Better schooling for children .732 .026 .743 .343 
Better social benefits .688 .071 .719 .369 
More jobs available -.055 .827 .303 .803 
Higher wages .016 .795 .360 .802 
Better business opportunities .054 .667 .343 .690 
Eigenvalues 2.958 1.122   
% of variance 42.25 16.02   
Cronbach's Alpha .751 .639   
N 1,496    
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
Component loadings greater than .4 are highlighted in bold. 
For further analyses, we have constructed a scale of 0 to 16 summing the four constituent items of the “socio-
political reasons” component. The binary variable ‘Socio-political reasons for choosing the UK was created 
by coding scale scores of 12 or greater as ‘Important’ and scores lower than 12 as ‘Less important.’ 
